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Abstract
The ultimate goal of any smart environment is to release users from the tasks
they usually perform to achieve comfort, efficiency, and service personalization.
To achieve this goal, we propose to use multiagent systems. In this report we de-
scribe the SETH architectur: a hierarchical, agent-based solution intended to be
applicable to different smart space scenarios, ranging from small environments,
like smart homes or smart offices, to large smart spaces like cities.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Our research focuses on using agents to automate routine tasks usually per-
formed by users, in order to provide them with both more comfort and effi-
ciency at home, in organizations and institutions. The main line of research
in our group is to identify tasks usually performed by humans which may be
automated and to develop agent-based systems to automate them.
Most of the tasks performed by humans involve some sort of interaction
with the environment, both to personalize it and to access the different services
and resources available. Therefore,one of the main lines of research in agent
technology is using software agents to automate environment personalization,
so that users are released from the routine tasks they should perform otherwise
to change their environment to suit their preferences and to access the available
services. The goal we seek is a smart environment, able to adapt itself to the
user needs and to provide customized interfaces to the services available at each
moment. To achieve this goal, we use multi-agent systems, as they have been
revealed as a good technology for the development of distributed, autonomous,
and intelligent systems.
In our previous work [1, 2] we designed and implemented an agent-based
software architecture for smart homes. We are now extending this architecture
to make it applicable to other environments as well. In particular, we have
developed a hierarchical, modular architecture, which we call SETH (Smart
EnvironmenT Hierarchy). The architecture can be deployed in layers, which
allows to create complex smart environments by combining, for instance, a cer-
tain number of smart rooms to create a smart building and a certain number of
smart buildings and smart outdoor spaces to create a smart city.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 recalls the most
relevant previous works our research is related to. Chapter 3 outlines our ar-
chitecture for smart spaces, describes the application scenario and summarizes
the different devices and software agents present in the system. The following
chapters cover the different subsystems of the SETH architecture. Chapter 4
covers personal agents, showing the role they play in service personalization and
how they are used to achieve that personalization. Service discovery and access
to services is detailed in chapter 5. Interface services are an important subset
of services and chapter 6 is dedicated to cover them. Chapter 8 describes the
usage of mobility and non-persistent service agents to allow services to “follow”
the user through different spaces. Context agents and context management
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are widely discussed in chapter 10. Finally, the security architecture for the
SETH system is outlined in chapter 11. The last chapter summarizes our main
contributions and sheds light on some future research.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
Our work is based on a number of previous findings from other authors on
different fields like software agents, smart environments, context-aware systems,
service personalization and security in pervasive computing . In this chapter we
provide a brief outline of each field, discussing both its objectives and the state
of different research lines.
2.1 Smart Environments and Software Agents
We can define a smart environment as one that is able to acquire and apply
knowledge about its inhabitants and their surroundings in order to adapt to the
inhabitants and meet the goals of comfort and efficiency [3]. These goals are
normally directed to adapt the environment to the user preferences, to increase
the performance of the user in his day-to-day tasks, and to optimize the energy
consumption of the systems involved.
To meet these goals, a smart environment system is based on a set of devices
which gather information about the environment -sensors- and a set of devices
able to actuate over the environment to change its conditions -effectors-. The
system will process the data collected by the sensors and, according to the pre-
defined set of goals-, will use the effectors to alter the user environment. How
the system decides the necessary actions depending on the information provided
by the sensors is the key problem in domotics, as it requires analyzing data from
several different sources distributed throughout the entire house, and coordinat-
ing equally heterogeneous effectors. These considerations lead to requirements
of distributed data mining, autonomy and intelligence that suggest the use of
software agents to develop this kind of system.
There are different definitions for software agents. From the viewpoint of
design and technology, we can define a software agent as a self-contained pro-
gram capable of controlling its own decision making and acting, based on its
perception of its environment, in pursuit of one or more objectives [4]. From
a functional, user’s perspective, a software agent can be seen as a software en-
tity to which tasks can be delegated [5]. This last definition, though simpler,
suggests more clearly how this technology can serve the problem of intelligent
automation of the environment. A multiagent system provides a distributed
and flexible framework and communication and negotiation mechanisms among
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its components that allows them to make complex decisions in an effective and
efficient way.
2.2 Context-aware systems
One of the key features of smart spaces is their ability to adapt themselves to
the preferences, desires and needs of their inhabitants. To achieve this ability,
smart spaces must be able to acquire knowledge about the inhabitants and their
surroundings. The information upon which this knowledge is built is called con-
text [6]. Context information in smart environments is usually gathered through
the use of heterogeneous sensors distributed throughout the entire space. Fur-
thermore, information must be processed in real time, so that the systems may
react to changes in the environment in a timely fashion.
Existing systems cover different domains such as tourist guides [7], indoor
information systems [8], and smart environments, e.g. The Essex intelligent dor-
mitory, iDorm [Hagras et al 2004][9]; The Gator Tech Smart House [10]; and the
MavHome [11]. These types of systems gather contextual information through
sensors placed in the environment, the information is reasoned, and actions are
taken to automate features of the environment. Thereby it is necesary to make
a decision before taking an action, and this requires an efficient context man-
agement. There are two ways to allow it [12]: context models and contextual
ontologies. Context models provide access to contextual information similar to
a database, whereas contextual ontologies represent knowledge about context.
2.3 Service Personalization in Smart Spaces
There are vastly different lines of research regarding smart environments and
service personalization. Our work is closely related to those involving potentially
large environments such as workplace buildings and cities, those involving hier-
archical arrangement of smart spaces, and those taking advantage of multiagent
systems.
Both the i-Room [13] and Gaia [14] present smart office application scenarios.
i-Room focuses on human computer interaction (HCI) in a single interactive
meeting room. Gaia defines Active Spaces as physical spaces coordinated by a
responsive context-based infrastructure. This infrastructure is made available to
service applications by means of an operating system (Gaia OS), which provides
context and event management services to running programs. As a future work,
the Gaia team plan to federate Gaia Services to aggregate different active spaces.
Cooltown [15] uses the technologies behind the Web to provide pervasive
nomadic computing in urban environments. In Cooltown, interest places and
resources are tagged with URLs or other identifiers that can be retrieved by
users’ personal devices by means of bar codes, RFIDs or IR transceivers. URLs
may be used to access the different services related to their associated points of
interest, and other identifiers (such as ISBN codes) may be resolved to URLs
which link to the services related to the identified item. Resources are grouped
in places, and for each defined place there is a place manager, which maintains
directories of resources, acting both as a resolver for looking up resources in
that place from their identifier and as a Web server providing information about
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resources.
The Galaxy Service Model [16] is intended to provide a hierarchical service
structure for a Smart Space Laboratory. Galaxy uses a set of smart devices,
which are called u-Textures and Smart Furnitures. These devices may be aggre-
gated to form a Smart Space Laboratory. The Galaxy Service Model allows to
export services provided by the different smart devices to create applications,
which can be composed into other applications, resulting in a multi-layered
service composition. Service discovery is performed hierarchically.
COBRA [17] takes advantage of multiagent systems to develop context-aware
applications. It is based on a broker-centric architecture used to provide run-
time support for context awareness in an Intelligent Meeting Room. In COBRA,
the environment is divided in domains, and there is a broker for each domain,
which is an autonomous agent that manages and controls the context model of
the specific domain. Though COBRA brokers are intended mainly for context
sharing, its centralized approach to management in each domain and the possi-
bility of sharing context between domains through context federation is closely
related to the approach we have taken in this work to develop our hierarchical
architecture for smart spaces.
2.4 Security Issues in Pervasive Computing
From a functional point of view, security is intended to assess the risks present on
a given environment and to develop safeguards and countermeasures to protect
the environment and its users from those risks [18]. Some of the key services se-
curity must provide are confidentiality and integrity of interchanged information,
authentication of communicating parties, access control and key management.
Confidentiality is the protection of information in the environment from
unauthorised access. In smart spaces, the term information acquires a unique
perspective [19]. The computer systems involved are potentially capable, as
a whole, of sensing nearly every aspect of interactions between users and the
environment or among users themselves, and all sensed information has the
potential of being stored, transmitted, queried and replayed. In environments
like smart offices, some of this information will need to be protected due to
its business-related sensitivity, but a great deal of the information sensed by
the system will be personal information about users. Therefore, apart from the
confidentiality issues usually present in information systems, new confidentiality
concerns raise regarding users privacy [20]. Even when the sensible information
is protected using cryptographic mechanisms, in smart spaces there is the risk
of traffic analysis to obtain some information, for example, when a device is
being used. This risk is increased by the use of wireless technology.
Integrity guarantees that only authorized parties are able to modify informa-
tion in the environment, be it by alteration, repetition, removal or delay of stored
information or messages between entities. Code integrity must be provided as
well, specially in system where mobile code is allowed. As with confidentiality,
protection of stored and transmitted information has been traditionally achieved
through cryptographic means.
Authentication of devices within the smart space can take advantage of ex-
isting approaches for computer and network security. Public or private key
cryptography can be used to authenticate information interchanges between de-
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vices, taking into accout the considerations about resource limitations stated
above. However, due to the largely decentralised and dynamic nature of smart
spaces, key management is the main problem we encounter when dealing with
authentication in these environments. Solutions that rely on connectivity to
an authentication or revocation server, from Kerberos to public-key certificates,
can only be applied to smart spaces where we can assume a hierarchical ar-
rangement of principals, and where addition and removals of principals in the
system may be controlled. In [21] such a centralised approach is applied to a
smart home, and we will show later its aplicability to smart offices as well. In
smart spaces where devices communicate through ad-hoc networks and where
devices need to be added and removed easily secure transient associations are
used to provide authentication in a distributed manner [22].
Access control intends to ensure that only authorised parties are allowed
to perform security-sensitive actions. In smart office scenarios access control
policies may become very complex, due to the different roles played by users in
the office. One solution to model such scenarios is Role-based Access Control
[23], or its extension to take into consideration evironmental information defin-
ing environmental roles [24]. Closely related to access control is delegation [25],
which acquire special importance in scenarios like smart offices.
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Chapter 3
A Hierarchy of Smart Spaces
Our architecture relies on the concept of smart spaces, which are specific, self-
contained locations within the environment. From a functional point of view, a
given smart space A is characterized by a set of devices DA, a set of available
services SA, and a given context CA. Smart spaces may be indoor or outdoor
spaces, and they may be also static or mobile -e.g. a smart car-.
Smart spaces (SSs) may be hierarchically arranged if the specific character-
istics of the environment require so. For example, in a smart office we may have
a Building Smart Space, which may also contain several Floor Smart Spaces,
each one containing several smarts spaces related to deskrooms, corridors, el-
evators... This hierarchical approach allows us to provide different layers of
services, context information, and security.
In our demonstration scenario, which we will keep referring to through the
rest of this document, we consider a city smart space, which contains three
indoor smart spaces, home, restaurant and workplace, and an outdoor smart
space monument. The workplace smart space contains the space secondF loor,
which also contains the spaces deskroom and presentationRoom. We consider
also a mobile smart space car. Figure 3.1 illustrates the hierarchy of smart
spaces in the described scenario.
Figure 3.1: The iEAP application scenario
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Inheritance rules may be established in the hierarchy to govern which context
information, services and devices are available to a given user or agent at a
specific location. In general, given two smart spaces A and B so that B contains
A -and we denote that as A ⊂ B-, a user located at A will see a set of available
services
S = SA ∪ SB→A
where SB→A ⊂ SB is the subset of services of the smart space B which
are available in the smart space A. In our demonstration scenario inheritance
rules allow, for example, that users within the home space may access city-level
services such as weather or traffic reports.
Aggregation rules may also be established so that a smart space may export
services to other spaces located at higher levels in the hierarchy. In general,
given two smart spaces A and B so that A ⊂ B -, a user located at B will see
a set of available services
S = SB ∪ SB←A
where SB←A ⊂ SA is the subset of services of the smart space A which
are available in the smart space B. In our demonstration scenario aggregation
rules allow, for example, that users within the cityspace may access reservation
services provided by the restaurant space.
Inheritance and aggregation rules may be combined to allow, for example,
that users within the home space have access through inheritance to the reser-
vation service which is provided at the restaurant space, but has been made
available to users in the city space by means of aggregation.
3.1 iEAP Devices
To meet its goals, the architecture relies on a set of devices distributed through-
out the environment. According to the degree of autonomy and intelligence
provided by the devices, mainly determined by its computational capacity to
include agents, we can divide the devices we can find in a given iEAP smart
space in four groups:
Smart Space Agent Platform (SSAP). It contains the agent platform which
supports the existence of all other agents in the smart space. It specifically
hosts the general purpose service and system agents, that is, all those agents
that actuate at a global level in the space, without being associated to a specific
sensor or effector. Generally, the SSAP contains the higher level agents of the
system. It also contains those agents used to control non-intelligent devices,
that is, devices with not enough processing or storage resources to host their
own agents. Every smart space in the iEAP must have its own SSAP.
Devices with Agents. Sensors and effectors with a certain degree of autonomy,
usually provided by agents running over an embedded Java virtual machine.
Devices without Agents. Sensors and effectors without autonomy or intelli-
gence, controlled from the SSAP.
Identification Devices. Each user must carry a mobile device, which is used
to identify the user to the system and determine user location within the smart
environment. The functionality of this device is very similar to that of the
Active Badge in [26]. Though it may be possible to provide certain services
to anonymous and/or unlocated users, we will focus in this work in service
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Figure 3.2: The iEAP architecture
personalisation, and thus we will assume the system is able to identify and
locate its users. A description of our first implementation of an identification
and location system based on Bluetooth technology is provided in [27].
Personal Devices. If the user wants to have access to personalised services
within the space, he is encouraged to carry a handheld, mobile device -cell phone,
PDA- which not only may provide the functionality of the indentification devices
above, but also hosts the necessary agents to learn, maintain and try to satisfy
user preferences, and to display the adequate interfaces to the available services
when needed. Personal devices are intended to move through different smart
spaces in the building and even through different buildings. To provide this
degree of self-containment and mobility, the Personal Device generates a virtual
smart space, which is placed in the hierarchy just below the smart space the
user is located in. More about personal devices and virtual smart spaces can be
found in chapter 7.
Devices without Agents depend directly on the SSAP, and they are linked
to it by means of standard communication technologies, like X.10 or EIB for
typical smart home devices or IR for remotely controlled appliances. Devices
with Agents, Personal Devices and the SSAP can communicate using TCP/IP.
Though any link-level technologies can be used, we have a preference for wireless
communication protocols -Bluetooth, WLAN...-. Fig. 3.2 shows the system
architecture, where the different communication layers can be seen.
The system has been developed over the open-source agent platform JADE1.
Using an already established agent platform releases us from the low-level tasks
about agent life-cycle and message interchange. Using Java language ensures
code portability to different machines. Furthermore, JADE complies to the
specifications of FIPA 2, which guarantees a certain degree of interoperability
with other agent-based systems. Note that the JADE platform extends to all
elements in the smart space containing agents, and those agents exist inside
a container associated to each element. The SSAP hosts the main container
of the platform. The personal devices have their own JADE agent platforms.
Communications between different smart spaces, whether they are at the same
1Java Agent DEvelopment framework (http://jade.cselt.it)
2Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (http://www.fipa.org)
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level in the hierarchy or not, are treated as inter-platform communications and
are performed via TCP/IP.
3.2 iEAP Software Agents
As we have stated before, our smart spaces rely on software agents to provide
their functionality. We may find different kinds of software agents in a typical
iEAP smart space:
• Smart Space Coordination Agent (SSCA): Provides device and service dis-
covery to all other users or agents in the smart space, and to SSCAs of
other smart spaces. It resides in the SSAPs.
• Device agents: They are the agents directly controlling the devices within
the smart space. They provide a unified interface to devices, so that other
agents in the system may use them regardless of specific hardware issues.
They are usually attached to the devices themselves, outside of the SSAP.
• System Agents: They reside in the SSAP, and add an additional layer
of intelligence on top of the devices in the environment through control
and coordination mechanisms, providing functionality directly related to
building management and security. Security agents and context agents fall
into this category. Context agents and context management are widely
discussed in chapter 10. The security architecture for the iEAP system is
presented in chapter 11.
• Service Agents: These agents are intended to provide services directly to
the user, and usually upon user’s request. They may rely on device agents,
system agents or other service agents to provide their functionality. In the
iEAP architecture, we distinguish two different classes of service agents:
– Persistent Service Agents: These agents provide services directly re-
lated to each specific smart space, such as climatization, lighting, or
interfaces to other services available in the space. Those services are
usually required to be available at any moment to every user in the
space, and so these agents are always active in the SSAP.
– Non-persistent Service Agents. These agents provide services more
related to the user, such as content access or unified messaging. They
are created by the SSCA for each request of the service and destroyed
once the use of the service has concluded. To allow these services
to “follow” the user as he moves throughout the environment, these
agents are able to move from one SSAP to another when user location
changes.
Service discovery and access to services is detailed in chapter 5. Inter-
face services are an important subset of services and chapter 6 is dedi-
cated to cover them. Chapter 8 describes the usage of mobility and non-
persistent service agents to allow services to “follow” the user through
different spaces.
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• Personal Agents (PA): Personal agents are directly associated to users.
Each personal agent learns its user preferences and tries to adapt the
environment to suit those preferences. Personal agents may issue requests
to system, service and device agents on behalf of their users, and they can
even negotiate with other personal agents when different user preferences
raise conflicts. Personal agents are the very representatives of users to
the environment, and they play a key role to achieve the perception of
“smartness” from the users.
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Chapter 4
Mobile agents for service
personalization: the Personal
Agent
The ultimate goal of any smart environment is to release users from the tasks
they usually perform to achieve comfort and efficiency. We approach this prob-
lem by placing software agents between the users and the environment. In
particular, in the iEAP system we use Personal Agents (PAs) as the final in-
termediaries between the users and the different available services. Any specific
service request coming from the user is directed to the personal agent, which
then forwards the request to the appropriate service agent. In this way, a per-
sonal agent is aware of the different service requests made by its associated users.
This, along with the knowledge about the context of every specific request, al-
lows the agent to learn user preferences by using automated learning techniques
such as the classical apriori algorythm [28], and thus to anticipate her desires
and try to satisfy them in advance by issuing automated service requests on
behalf of the user.
Interaction between the user and the service agent is usually performed
through the use of context and interface agents. Figure 4.1 shows an example
of such an interaction. Imagine a given user is in the presentationRoom space.
This information is notified to the PA by the context agents (1). If the user acts
over the light control panel to dim the lights (2), this action causes a message to
be sent (3) to the user’s personal agent requesting the specific action -e.g. “dim
the lights down to half intensity”-. The PA then forwards the request to the
appropriate service agent (4), which finally performs the operation. Eventually,
the personal agent may learn that its associated user always sets the lights to
half intensity after turning on the projector, being able to anticipate this action
in subsequent times by requesting the service automatically on behalf of the
user (5). Detailed descriptions about the processes concerning service, interface
and context agents are given in chapters 5, 6 and 10, respectively, so we will not
cover them here.
Personal agents are the agents responsible of enforcing user preferences, and
they need to be contacted whenever their associated users request a service.
This may produce a high amount of messages in an application scenario with
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Figure 4.1: The Personal Agent as an intermediary between the user and the
system
a certain number of potential users and available services. Should the personal
agents be static, there would be a significant increase of inter-platform commu-
nication and bandwith consumption when the user left the smart space where
her personal agent resided. Taking this into account, personal agents in the
iEAP architecture move from one smart space agent platform to another when
required, thus effectively following user movements throughout the environment.
Personal agents reside originally in a given smart space, which is called the
PA’s home agent platform (HAP). A personal agent’s HAP is the SSAP which
created the PA, and is usually associated to the user’s residence. The address of
the personal agent of a given user is stored in her identification device, so that
any SSCA can know where to locate the PA of any identified user.
A personal agent is invited to move to a SSAP when a service that can
be personalized to the user becomes active. This can be triggered by a direct
intervention from the user -e.g. the user activate an interface panel- or be
automatic -e.g. a user enters a smart space where lighting can be personalised-.
Anyway, it is the user’s PA who makes the decision of moving to the inviting
SSAP. The reasons because of which a personal agent may refuse to move to a
SSAP can be diverse, ranging from knowledge that its associated user does not
require personalisation for a given service -e.g. lighting- to security reasons -e.g.
the inviting SSAP is not trusted-. If the PA accepts the invitation, it clones
itself at its HAP to save current state and moves to the inviting SSAP, where
it resumes execution and starts providing service personalization to its user.
When the user leaves the smart space, the PA returns to its HAP, synchronizing
any changes on the user model with the clone. Cloning is used to protect the
integrity of the personal agent.
Since a user may move through many smart spaces in the hierarchy tree,
moving the PA back to its HAP whenever the user moves may be very inefficient.
Instead, the personal agent leaves a SSAP only when its associated user requests
personalised services in another SSAP or when she enters a smart space that
is at the same level or higher in the hierarchy tree. Then the PA moves to the
smart space the user has entered if it is not an ancestor of the agent’s HAP
15
Figure 4.2: Personal agent mobility
in the hierarchy tree, otherwise it returns to the HAP. In the same way, the
personal agent of an identified user is first searched for at the immediate upper
level in the hierarchy tree. If it is not there, the next upper level is searched for,
unless that level is an ancestor of the HAP. In that case, the PA is searched for
at its HAP.
Figure 4.2 illustrates personal agent mobility in our application scenario.
Both the user Bob and its personal agent reside in the home smart space, which
is also the home agent platform (HAP) of the PA. Bob now leaves his home and
goes for a walk through the city (1). His personal agent notices Bob is not home,
and performs any necessary actions in the home smart space accordingly -e.g.
turn off the lights-, but stays at its HAP as long as Bob does not need any service.
Now Bob approaches the monument smart space (2) and presses the button
of an interface panel there. The SSCA at the monument (SSCAmonument)
identifies Bob through his ID device, and gains from this device the address of
the personal agent (3). This address is of the form PABob@home.city. Since
the monument is at monument.city (at the same level in the hierarchy than
the HAP of the PA), SSCAmonument contacts SSCAhome (4) to request the
PA to move to the monument smart space. The PA agent is cloned and then
transferred to the monument SSAP (5), where it can attend Bob’s request.
Bob now leaves the monument and heads towards his workplace (6). Bob
is now at city level, which is higher in the hierarchy than the agent’s HAP,
so the PA moves back to home (7), synchronizing any changes on the user
model with the clone. When Bob enters his workplace building (8) he does not
request any service, so there is no need for the personal agent to move from
its HAP. First interaction with the system at the workplace is at the second
floor, when he activates a interface panel there (9). This is again a request
for a personalizable service (the user is requesting an interface which could be
personalized), so SSCAsecondF loor tries to find Bob’s personal agent. Again, the
address aquired from the ID device is PABob@home.city, and the secondF loor
is at secondFloor.workplace.city, so SSCAsecondF loorasks SSCAworkplace (10)
and, since the PA is not there and the same hierarchy level than the HAP has
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been reached, it finally asks SSCAhome(11), which confirms the presence of the
personal agent in the HAP. As in the previous case, the PA migrates from its
HAP to the secondF loor (12), where it can provide its user the presonalized
services requested.
Now Bob enters his deskroom (13). As the deskroom smart space is lower
in the hierarchy (it is at deskroom.secondFloor.workplace.city) there is no need
for the personal agent to move if Bob does not request a specific service. How-
ever, an automatic lighting personalization service is available at this space, and
the SSCAdeskroom tries to find the PA to see if Bob may desire to have this
service. Following the same strategy that in the previous cases, it first asks
SSCAsecondF loor (14). The personal agent is in the secondF loor SSAP, so no
more searches are needed and the PA moves to the deskroom SSAP (15).
After some hours of work at his deskroom, Bob decides to go home. He leaves
the deskroom (16) and the second floor (18), and his personal agent follows
him (17 and 19, respectively), as, though he is no requesting any service, he
is moving to upper levels in the hierarchy tree (secondfloor.workplace.city and
workplace.city). When he lefts the workplace (20), the PA returns to the HAP
(21), since the city smart space is higher in the hierarchy tree than the home.
When Bob arrives home, he will find his personal agent there taking care of his
preferences.
For users not having their own personal agents (e.g. casual visitors to the
city), the system can generate temporary PAs for them with a basic set of
preferences, which can be then updated through configuration or experience as
usual. For this to be feasible, there must be a Temporary PAs HAP, which is
in charge of generating those agents, synchronizing the changes on them, and
destroying them when they are no longer necessary. In our application scenario,
this temporary HAP is at city level (with address visitors.city).
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Chapter 5
Service Discovery and Access
to Services
In the previous chapter, we have seen how Personal Agents move through the
different SSAPs, following the movements of their associated users to provide
personalized services at each location. But in order to provide this personaliza-
tion, personal agents need to know which are the services available, and how to
access them.
5.1 Service Discovery
Service discovery functionality is provided by the Smart Space Coordination
Agents (SSCAs). As the coordinator of a given smart space, an SSCA must be
aware of all agents present in the space, and all the services they may provide.
This is accomplished through a process of registration whenever a new agent or
device is added to the smart space. The registration process takes advantage of
the directory services provided by the FIPA DFs [29], and it is not detailed here.
Let us assume that the SSCA knows all devices, agents and services available
at its associated smart space. The address to the SSCA of a given smart space
is provided by the context agents when the PA enters the associated SSAP, so
let us also assume that the personal agent knows the addresses of all relevant
SSCAs in the hierarchy. If not, it can always query the context agents for the
SSCA of a given SSAP in the hierarchy tree.
At any given time a personal agent can query the SSCA at its SSAP for a
list of available services. Queries may be general or specific -i.e. request a list
of all available services which meet certain characteristics-. The returned list of
services includes the name of the service, the service agents that provide them,
and the service description, which in turn contains the information needed by
the PA to know how to access the service.
As we stated in chapter 3, services may be inherited from higher levels in
the hierarchy or aggregated from lower levels. Services may be inherited or
aggregated at the SSCA level or at the personal agent level. Inheritance or
aggregation at the SSCA level occurs when an SSCA is interested in providing
a service available at another SSAP. In this case, the SSCA adds the service to
its list of available services, providing the address to the agent who provide the
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Figure 5.1: Inheritance, aggregation and service discovery
service at the remote SSAP. In our application scenario, service inheritance at
the SSCA level is provided automatically, that is, all SSCAs query regularly their
upper level SSCAs to see which services are available for inheritance. Service
aggregation is provided by a subscription mechanism. Lower level service agents
subscribe to upper-level SSCAs to have their services made available to users at
the upper levels of the hierarchy.
In scenarios with many levels in the hierarchy, automatic inheritance and
aggregation may result in huge lists of available services. We solve this by
limiting automatic inheritance and aggregation to a small subset of services,
and providing extended search services at the SSCAs only when specific service
discovery queries yield void results -i.e. a given service is not found within
the list of available services, and the search is propagated to selected SSCAs
at higher and lower levels to see if the service may be provided at another
SSAP-. Inheritance and aggregation of services at the personal agent level
can be performed at any time by issuing direct queries from the PA to the
corresponding SSCAs.
We can see an example of service aggregation, service inheritance and service
discovery for our application scenario in Figure 5.1. There is a user directory
service at the presentationRoom smart space, which the corresponding SSCA
(SSCApresentationRoom) has had aggregated at workplace level (1). This user
directory service is inherited by the SSCAsecondF loorto be provided at floor level
(2). User Alice is in her deskroom, and her associated PA knows she has an
appointment to have lunch with user Bob at the restaurant in an hour. The
personal agent decides to notify Bob, but it does not know where he is, though
based on the experience of another days he is probably at the presentation room.
To confirm that, the PA queries the SSCAdeskroomfor a directory service for
the presentation room (3). SSCAdeskroomhas not such service in its list, but it
propagates the query up in the hierarchy (4), receives from SSCAsecondF loor (5)
the information requested, and finally forwards it to the PA (6). After being able
to locate Bob and remind him of the meeting, Alice personal agent decides to
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make a reservation in a restaurant. The SSCA at the restaurant has previously
advertised its reservation service to SSCAcity (7), but none of the SSCAs of the
building have inherited that service, nor are they willing to propagate service
discovery requests for this kind of services (e.g. it may be against their business
policy). So, perhaps after a series of unsuccessful searches at floor and workspace
level, Alice’s personal agent will have to send its query directly to SSCAcity (8)
to find the agents who are providing restaurant reservation services.
5.2 Access to services
To access to a given service, a PA only need to send a request message to the
agent providing that service. The service agent will then attemp to provide the
service, usually by requesting actions to other service, system or device agents.
However, the process may be slightly more complex depending on the kind of
service requested. As we mentioned in Section 3.2, there are services directly
related to each specific smart space, such as climatization, lighting, or interfaces
which are required to be available at any moment to every user in the space,
and so they are provided by persistent service agents. These agents are always
active in the SSAP, and their addresses are specified in the service lists returned
by the SSCA, so that any PA can request services directly to these agents at
any time.
However, there are other services, such as content access or unified messag-
ing, which are more directly related to the user who requests them, and they are
provided by non-persistent service agents, which are created for each specific
request for the service and destroyed once the service has been provided. The
SSCA uses a special address value in the list of available services to indicate
which services are provided by non-persistent agents. If a PA wants to access
a service provided by a non-persistent agent, it must first request the SSCA to
create the agent. The non-persistent agent is created and its address returned
to the PA, so that it can issue the service request as in the previous case.
Figure 5.2 illustrates a typical service access case in the SETH system. User
Alice enters the presentationRoom smart space. The personal agent arrives to
the presentation room SSAP through one of the processes described in chapter
4. Context agents notify both the PA and SSCApresentationRoom of this event
(1). The personal agent, knowing that its user is going to make presentation
using a slideshow document, asks SSCApresentationRoom for an agent providing
a presentation service (2). No such agent is persistently active in the SSAP,
so SSCApresentationRoom creates an instance of a Non-persistent Presentation
Service Agent (NPPSA) (3) and returns its address to the PA(4). The personal
agent then contacts the NPPSA and requests it to present a slideshow of a given
document stored in the computer at Alice’s deskroom (5). Then the NPPSA
contacts SSCAdeskroom to learn who to ask for the document (6). He is given
the address of a persistent File Transfer Service Agent (FTSA) (7), which the
NPPSA contacts to request the file (8). The FTSA obtains the file from the
device agent (DA) associated to the Alice’s desktop computer (9) and transfers
it to the NPPSA (10). Finally, the NPPSA requests the device agent of the
projector in the presentation room to display the slideshow presentation (11).
Any typical interaction such as the described above may involve service
discovery requests to different SSAPs, requests to service and device agents, and
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Figure 5.2: Access to services
even access to resources within the user’s desktop computers. This flexibility of
the interaction mechanism provided by agents greatly improve functionality of
the smart space, but also raises some relevant security concerns that must be
addressed in order to ensure there is no misuse of the provided infrastructure.
An analysis of the security considerations in smart spaces and a proposal of a
security architecture for the iEAP is provided in Chapter 11.
21
Chapter 6
User-system interaction:
interface devices and agents
Ideally a smart space should be able to anticipate to the desires of its inhabitants
and adapt the environment accordingly to suit their needs at every moment.
However, the inherent complexity of human beliefs, desires and intentions makes
this impossible to achieve completely in the real world. The preferences of a
given user may be unknown to the system, for example, when it is the first time
a user enters a given space. Even if the user preferences are known, they may
change over time, or they may be affected momentarily by facts unknown to
the system. Sooner or later the user will need something different than what
the system thinks she needs, and there must be a way for the user to express
that to the system. Furthermore, the system may need to communicate with
the user, for example, to ask for details about how to provide a service or for a
confirmation before automatically performing some sensitive action. Therefore,
smart spaces cannot rely only in proactivity, but also need a certain degree of
interactivity. In the iEAP architecture, this degree of interactivity is provided
by the interface devices and agents.
Any devices which may allow the user to interact with the system in any way
can be used as interface devices. This includes devices able to show information
to the user, like TV and computer screens or speakers, and devices which can
be used by the user to give information to the system, like remote controls
or keyboards. We can even imagine a light bulb used as an interface device,
emitting flashes to notify a deaf user which is away from his computer about
the reception of an email.
As described in Chapter 3.2, devices are controlled by device agents (DA),
which may reside in the devices themselves or in the SSAP. To provide the
interface services through these devices, a Smart Space Interface Agent (SSIA)
is always active in each SSAP. The SSIA receives the requests for interaction,
formats the information accordingly with the devices or agents involved and
forwards them to the approppriate destination.
We can distinguish different classes of user-system interactions, depending
on the initiator of the interaction and the kind of devices used as interfaces.
The simplest user-system interactions are initiated by the system, as shown in
Figure 6.1. An agent (usually the Personal Agent) wants to communicate with
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Figure 6.1: An agent requests to interact with the user through an interface
the user, and requests the SSIA (1) to launch the interaction. The request must
include the information to be shown and some formatting guidelines, along with
any response requirements from the user. In the current implementation, in-
teractions are specified using XML. As an option, the request may include also
user preferences about interfaces, such as color schemas or resolution for image
display or volume for acoustic interfaces. Based on the information and pref-
erences received in the request, the SSIA chooses among all available devices
the most suitable one -or ones, as there may be different devices for input and
output or for different kinds of input and output- and constructs the approppri-
ate interface based on the requirements placed by the requesting agent and the
specific features of the device. Finally, it requests to the corresponding device
agent to show or to acquire the corresponding information (2). The user may
now use this device (3) to interact with the agent which originally requested the
interface, and any interaction is passed back through the device agent (4) to the
interface agent (5) and finally to the requesting agent (6).
The process gets slightly more complex when it is the user who initiates
the interaction. Such a case is illustrated in Figure 6.2. Imagine user Alice is
in her deskroom and activates the interface panel there (1). The interaction
is notified by the corresponding device agent to the SSIAdeskroom(2), which in
turn, since the interface is a personalizable service, should notify Alice’s personal
agent. This is not an immediate issue. First, provided the interface device is
not biometric, the interface agent does not necessarily know that the user who
has activated the panel is Alice. At most, it can query the context agents (3)
to know which users are within the smart space. Let us asume for this case
that there is only one user in the deskroom smart space, and that it has been
correctly identified as Alice. Furthermore the SSIAdeskroom does not know the
address of Alice’s PA. It then asks the SSCAdeskroomfor it (4). The coordinator
agent will eventually request the personal agent to move to the deskroom SSAP
if it was not already there (5), and will return the address of the PA to the
interface agent (6), which will finally be able to notify the personal agent (7).
At this point, the PA knows that Alice has activated the interface panel, and
may initiate a service discovery process as detailed in Chapter 5.1. Eventually,
it will get a list of available services, filter and format it according to Alice’s
preferences, and request the SSIAdeskroom (8) to show it to the user. Now the
process is the same than in the previous case, with the reuest passing through
the SSIA to the device agent (9) and finally to the user (10).
When there are several users within the same space, the process described
above may vary depending on the type of interface device being activated, the
nature of the interaction and the policies associated to the involved users, ser-
vices and smart spaces. Some devices can be considered as personal interface
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Figure 6.2: A user activates an interface panel to see available services in a
smart space
devices under some circumstances, which mean that the interaction is restricted
to a known user. Biometric devices, personal handheld devices like PDAs or cell
phones or computer screens where a user has logged in are examples of devices
where information shown may be assumed to be received only by the legitimate
user, and where any input may be assumed to come from the legitimate user1.
Other devices such as public interface panels, remote controls or switches are
considered shared interface devices, which means that there may be several users
interacting with the system through these devices at a given time.
An interaction using shared interface devices is shown in Figure 6.3. Suppose
now that both Alice and Bob are in the deskroom. In this case it is Bob who
activates the interface panel (1), but let us assume the system has no way to
know which user did it. As in the previous case, the interaction is notified to the
SSIAdeskroom(2), and it gets from the context agents the list of users within
the smart space (3). As there are two users in the deskroom, the interface
agent requests to the SSCAdeskroom the addresses of both personal agents (4
and 5) and notifies them (6) which, for the sake of simplicity, we will assume
to be already in the deskroom SSAP. At this point any of the PAs could choose
to ignore the notification (for instance, because it knows its associated user is
typing at the keyboard and could not be the one who activated the panel). Let
us assume that both agents consider that the interaction may have been initiated
by their associated user, and they initiate the service discovery process. Each PA
receives the list of available services and filters it taking into account the presence
of the other user, which they know from the context agents. This allows the
personal agents to enforce privacy and access rights of their associated users
by omitting private services or setting further authentication requirements -e.g.
passwords or biometric confirmation- to access sensitive services. This filtering
process could even involve a negotiation between both PAs (7). Eventually,
both personal agents will send an interface request to the SSIAdeskroom (8),
which will construct a merged interface and request the interface device to show
it (9). Since the device is shared, the interface shown will be available to both
users (10).
1Depending on the nature of the interaction, such assumptions could not be made and fur-
ther authentication and confirmation mechanisms should be required to ensure the legitimacy
of the interaction.
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Figure 6.3: Shared interface devices
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Chapter 7
Personal Mobile Devices and
Virtual Smart Spaces
Mobile devices such as cell phones and PDAs already offer their users some
kinds of service personalization, like phone directories, calculators, calendar
management. But service personalization through personal mobile devices can
be taken one step further. An iEAP Personal Device runs its own SSAP, hosting
an SSCA and the necessary system, service and device agents to provide its
functionality to its user. In this way, a personal device generates a virtual smart
space, which overlaps to the smart space where the user is, augmenting the
services provided by the environment.
From an architectural point of view, this overlapping is straightforward.
When the personal agent initiates a service discovery process for the smart
space where the user is located in, it contacts also the personal device SSCA and
construct the list of available services taking into account the services provided
by the personal device. This allows not only to increase the number of services
available to the user, but also to provide a higher degree of personalization, as
personal mobile devices can usually be seen as personal interface devices for the
purposes discussed in the previous chapter.
Figure 7.1 shows a use case where a personal device is used to provide a
personal interface. User Alice is at home, and has brought her personal device
(a smart phone) with her. Her personal agent wants to show her the services
available at the home smart space. Since the PA has been notified about the
presence of the personal device by the context agents (1), it issues service discov-
ery requests against both the SSCAhome and the SSCAsmartphone (2). When
the response is received (3) the personal agent may decide to request an interface
to either the SSIA of the home smart space (SSIAhome) or to the one residing
in the smart phone (SSIAsmartphone). In this case, the PA decides that it is
more appropriate to use a personal interface to show Alice the service list -for
example, because there are other users at home-, and issues the request to the
SSIAsmartphone (4), which processes it, construct the interface and requests the
corresponding device agent to show it to Alice (5 and 6).
In the previous example, the personal agent resides in the home SSAP, and
may access the services provided at both the physical smart space where the
user is and the virtual smart space created by the smartphone by contacting the
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Figure 7.1: Personal devices and virtual smart spaces
appropriate SSCA and service agents in each case. However, the main benefit
coming from the usage of personal mobile devices is the possibility of having the
PA residing in the personal device SSAP, cause it greatly simplifies the process
of personal agent mobility. If the personal device hosts the user’s PA, when
she moves throughout the different smart spaces the personal agent actually
moves with her while staying in the same SSAP (the personal device SSAP).
This greatly enhances the process of personal agent discovery and mobility.
To take advantage of the inherent mobility of personal devices, it is necessary
to be able to identify and locate any personal device within a given smart space.
This is achieved through a subset of context agents by using a personal device
location system. This system is an extension of the one used in the iHAP [27]
and we will not detail it here. Let us assume that, as long as the personal device
has TCP/IP wireless connectivity, both the SSCA of the virtual smart space
associated to the device and the SSCA of the physical space where the device
is located are notified by the context agents about any changes in the location
of the personal device. The PA associated to the owner of the personal device
is notified as well.
Personal agent mobility using personal devices follows the same rules de-
scribed in chapter 4, taking into account that the virtual smart space generated
by the device offers automatic service personalisation, and thus, whenever the
user is in the proximity of the personal device, the PA will be invited to move
to the device. The personal agent will usually accept the invitation and move,
except if the physical space where the user is is the agent’s HAP. Once the PA is
in the personal device SSAP, the user may move from one physical smart space
to another and, as long as he brings his personal device with him, the personal
agent will not need to move, since it is the virtual smart space created by the
personal device which moves through the hierarchy tree, and context agents
take care of notifying any interested agents -mainly the PA and the SSCAs- so
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that the different smart spaces can communicate with the PA seamlessly.
Difficulties arise when the personal device loses TCP/IP connectivity, e.g.
due to power-saving configurations, or when, once the PA is in the user’s per-
sonal device, the user moves to another smart space without bringing the per-
sonal device with him. In both cases, the user may identify to the new smart
space and request a service. At this point, the SSCA needs to contact the user’s
personal agent. The location process is analogous to that described in chapter
4: the personal agent of an identified user is first searched for at the immedi-
ate upper level in the hierarchy tree. If it is not there, the next upper level is
searched for. Since SSCAs are notified whenever a personal device enters their
associated SSAPs, they are aware of the last known location of the personal
device and keep this information until the personal agent leaves their branch of
the hierarchy tree. If the immediate upper node in the tree is an ancestor of
the HAP, the PA is searched for at its HAP. This will usually happen when the
device has lost TCP connectivity. In this case, the SSCA at the HAP will inform
the requesting SSCA that the user’s PA should be in the user’s personal device.
Then the SSCA may ask the user (through any interface device available) to
turn on communications at the personal device, so that the personal agent can
be contacted.
If, after the process detailed above, the user’s PA is contacted, the PA may
interact with the requesting SSAP from the user’s personal device or decide to
move to the new SSAP. The PA will usually decide to move when the user is
in another physical smart space than the device, or when the device is running
out of battery. Should the PA decide to move from the personal device, it will
clone before moving to protect agent integrity.
If, after the process detailed above, the user’s personal agent is not contacted
(e.g. the personal device has completely run out of battery), the interested SSCA
can request the HAP to send another clone of the PA to the smart space where
the user is.
We can see some of the cases discussed above through the same example
seen in chapter 4. In figure 7.2, let us assume as the starting point the end of
the previous example, that is, Alice is at home, and her smartphone is showing
her a list of available services. Now Alice and her smart phone leave the house
(1), which is noticed by both SSCAs and the PA through the context agents.
The personal agent then perform any necessary actions at the home smart space
-e.g. turning off the lights, setting up the security alarm...-, clones itselfs and
moves to the smartphone SSAP (2). There, it decides to update the list of
available services, so it removes the services corresponding to the home smart
space, asks the SSCAcity about any available services at city level (3), and
requests the appropriate interface to be shown at the smartphone1. When the
user enters the monument smart space (4), context agents notify the PA’s and
both SSCAs, so the personal agent can directly query the SSCAmonument for
the list of available services (5) to update the list shown at the interface of the
personal device. When Alice activates the interface panel at the monument, the
SSCAmonumentalready knows that Alice’s PA is in her smartphone, and thus
it is not necessary to contact the agent’s HAP.
Let us suppose that, after Alice leaves the monument and heads towards
1For the sake of simplicity, we have omitted the interactions related to interface and service
access through the example, and we show only the interactions related to service and agent
discovery between the SSCAs and the PA.
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Figure 7.2: Using personal devices to enhance personal agent mobility
her workplace (6), she stops using the smart phone to access available ser-
vices and it enters a power saving mode, losing wireless TCP/IP connectivity.
When Alice arrives at her workplace (7), the system cannot notice the pres-
ence of the personal device, nor can the personal device be aware of the new
smart space the user is into. So when Alice enters the second floor and ac-
tivates the interface panel there (8), the SSCAsecondF loorperform the usual
search for Alice’s PA from the address gained through Alice’s ID device -say
PAAlice@home.city), querying SSCAworkplace (9) and SSCAhome(10) for it.
SSCAhometells SSCAsecondfloor that Alice’s personal agent has moved into her
personal device, and also adds any information needed to contact the smart-
phone SSAP. The SSCAsecondFloor can now use the interface panel to ask Alice
to turn on wireless communications on her smartphone. When Alice does so
(11), TCP connectivity with the smartphone SSAP is regained, and agents
within the secondFloor SSAP can contact Alice’s PA as usual (12). Now sup-
pose that Alice stays at the second floor without using her personal device and,
unfortunately, the smartphone entered again its power saving mode. When Alice
moves into the deskroom (13), SSCAdeskroom is not aware about the presence
of the personal device, so it will run a search for the personal agent starting at
SSCAsecondF loor (14), who will return the information gained from the HAP,
so that SSCAdeskroom can learn how to contact the PA, have Alice turn on the
communications on the smart phone (15) and proceed as usual (16).
After some hours of work, Alice leaves the deskroom (17), the second floor
(18) and the workplace (19), and carries the smartphone with her. When she
arrives home (20), the PA returns to the HAP and synchronizes with its clone
there (21).
Modular and hierarchical design of the iEAP architecture allows using differ-
ent strategies and levels of coupling between the personal agents, the personal
devices, and the identification devices. In the scenario we have shown the PA
moves to the personal device when it is needed, and can move out to its HAP or
to another SSAP whenever it deems it appropriate. Furthermore, Alice carries
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her own ID device independently from the personal device. However, we can
think of a higly-coupled strategy where Alice ID device is her personal device,
so that she is required to carry her personal device with her at any time to be
properly identified by the system. We can even set the personal device as the
personal agent’s HAP, so that the PA will never need to move out of the device.
Of course, this strategy has its drawbacks too. If the personal device runs out of
battery, the personal agent loses its HAP, which is not desirable. But it shows
the high degree of flexibility provided by the architecture.
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Chapter 8
Following the User
throughout the Smart Spaces:
Non-persistent Service Agents
As we saw in section 3.2, non-persistent service agents (NPSA) are created by
the SSCAs to address specific service requests made by users, and cease to exist
when they are no longer needed. These agents are highly coupled to the specific
requests they’re associated to, and therefor to the specific users who made the
requests. When a user who is accessing a service provided by an NPSA agent
in a given smart space leaves this smart space, he is no longer accessing the
service provided by the non-persistent service agent, and thus the agent could
be terminated. This is not always the best strategy. The user could return to
the smart space later and expect to resume access to the service, or even want
to access to the same service in another space. Although the user (or the PA)
could re-issue the request in the new space, this may not have always the desired
effect. Some services, such as access to multimedia content, may be required to
hold their state between successive requests, to prevent the user, for example,
from having to scroll to the desired slide of a presentation or having to select the
desired scene of a DVD whenever the user wants to resume the operation of the
service. For this kind of services, the goal is the perception of the service being
following the user movements throughout the different smart spaces. In our
first implementation of an architecture for smart homes, the iHAP, we achieved
this goal by making the service agent to return the service state information to
the personal agent before stopping the service. Whenever the user entered a
new space, the personal agent requested the service to the service agent there,
providing the state information of the last run [2]. Although this is an effective
strategy, it presents some limitations when dealing with multiple users and
services.
In the iEAP architecture, user follow-up through the different smart spaces
is achieved in a more effective and natural way, by making the non-persistent
service agents able to move between different SSAPs. This allows these service
agents to actually follow the user, stopping service execution when the user
leaves a space and resuming it at the same point when the user enters a new
space.
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Figure 8.1: Using mobile agents to make services “follow” the user
When a given user leaves the smart space where he is accessing a service
provided by an NPSA, the service agent asks the PA wether it wants it to
follow the user to the next space or not. The personal agent may then request
the NPSA to move, to terminate execution -e.g. the user no longer wants the
service- or to wait there for further instructions -e.g. the user will return to the
same space shortly-.
If the non-persistent service agent is requested to move, it will attempt to
perform the migration. The migration may not succeed due to several reasons.
Perhaps the destination SSAP has no resources to host the agent, or may not
allow the agent to move due to security concerns. If the attempt to move is
unsuccessful, the NPSA will notify the PA and ask for further instructions. If
it is successful, it will attempt to resume the service at the new SSAP. This
may involve contacting other service and device agents, and may require even
to wait for resources if, for example, the devices required to provide the service
are being used by another users or agents.
Figure 8.1 illustrates how non-persistent service agents can be used to make
services “follow” a given user throughout the different smart spaces. User Alice
is in her deskroom, having a video-conference provided by a non-persistant ser-
vice agent (NPSAconference) through a device agent on her desktop computer.
She leaves her deskroom without closing the conference, but brings with her her
smartphone (1), and the NPSAconference asks Alice’s personal agent whether it
should move to the personal device or not (2). The response is affirmative, and
so the NPSAconference moves to the smart phone (3), asks the SSCAsmartphone
for the adresses of any device agents needed (4) and resumes service execution
in the smart phone (5). Alice passes then through the secondFloor and work-
place smart spaces (6) and, as the video-conference service is being provided
by the virtual smart space created by the smart phone, there is no need for
the NPSAconference to move to any of these spaces. When Alice enters her
car (7), her PA decides that, for safety reasons, the service must be no longer
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provided through the smartphone, and asks the NPSAconference (8) to try to
move to the car SSAP. The non-persistent agent moves to the new platform (9)
and asks the SSCAcar for the addreses of the agents it needs to provide the
service (10). In this case, there is no agent able to display video, and thus the
service is turned into an audio conference through the car speakers (11). Alice
drives home while going on with the conversation (12). When she arrives home
and leaves her car (13), the process repeats to move the video conference service
back to the smartphone (14, 15, 16 and 17). When she finally enters the home
smart space (18), the video conference moves seamlessly to the living room TV
(19, 20, 21 and 22).
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Chapter 9
Multiple users and shared
services
Some services can be accessed by users other than the initial requester of the
service. We call these shared services, and they include, among others, light-
ing, temperature regulation, or media content display through shared interface
devices. Whenever a shared service is requested and going to be started, the
personal agents associated to all users in the room are notified, so that they
can act in consequence to adapt the shared service to the preferences of their
users -e.g. by negotiating the final temperature of the space- or update the user
profiles accordingly -e.g. adding a given movie to the list of favorites for a given
user-. The agent in charge of the notification may be any of the service or device
agents involved, depending on the specific case.
Shared services like lighting and temperature control are often provided by
persistent service agents. However, in the case of services provided by non-
persistent agents, additional issues arise. If there are several users in a smart
space, and a given user requests a shared service provided by a non-persistent
agent (NPSA), the agent is created to serve that specific request. If the user
now leaves that space to enter another one, the NPSA should move to the new
space, provided that the user wants the service to follow him, as detailed in
chapter 8. However, if the non-persistent agent moves, the service would stop
being accessible at the previous space, and this may not be always the desired
effect. To address this issue, non-persistent agents who provide shared services
may be dinamically associated to any other users in the space where the service
is running, at request of the PA of each user1. A NPSA will try to follow any
associated user who leaves the smart space where it is running, but will clone
before moving while there are associated users staying at the space. In this way,
the service may ’follow’ any user leaving a given space while being still available
to any users left.
We can see an example of shared service handling in figure 9.1. Users Alice
and Bob are in the deskroom and in the presentation room, respectively. Alice
is watching a video provided by the non-persistent service agent NPSAvideo,
through the device agent of her desktop computer DAcomputer. Bob, at the
1Intervention of the user’s PA is required to avoid a service to be accidentally associated
to a user which crosses a given space A momentarily while moving between spaces B and C.
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Figure 9.1: Multiple users and shared services
same time is watching a live-conference provided by the agent NPSAconference
through the device agent of the projector DAprojector. After a while, Alice
leaves her deskroom without stopping the video, bringing her smartphone with
her (1). The NPSAvideocontacts Alice’s personal agent (PAAlice) and is told
to move to the smartphone SSAP (2). Once the agent has been allowed to
move, it contacts DAcomputer to stop the service (3) and moves (4). Once in the
smartphone SSAP, it tries to resume the video service, but it is not allowed to
do so by the SSCAsmartphone due to battery limitations (5), so it asks the PA
what to do, and is told to keep waiting until there are more resources available
to provide the service (6). The possibility of moving to the secondFloor SSAP
is discarded, as there is no device agent there able to display the video.
Alice then enters the presentation room, where Bob is watching the live-
conference (7). As the live-conference service is being provided through the
presentation room projector, it is considered a shared service, and PAAlice is
notified about that when Alice enters the space (8). The personal agent decides
not to take any action about it at the moment, and instead asks NPSAvideo to
move to the presentationRoom SSAP (9). The non-persistent agent moves to
the new platform (10) and asks the SSCApresentationRoomfor the addresses of
any device agents suitable to display the video (11), and learns the only agent
with video display capabilities is DAprojector. When NPSAvideo requests this
device agent to resume the video service, it finds out the device is busy (12),
so it reports that to PAAliceand waits for further instructions (13). After some
minutes of Alice being in the presentation room without taking any further
action, PAAlice deduces she is watching the live-conference too, and thus asks
NPSAconference to add Alice to its list of associated users (14).
Now Bob decides to leave the presentation room, bringing with him his
PDA (15). The NPSAconference contacts PABob and is told to move to the pda
SSAP (16). Since there is another user associated to the conference service in
the presentation room (Alice), the NPSAconference clones before moving (17).
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The clone in Bob’s personal device contacts the SSCApdafor the addresses of
any agents required (18) and resumes the conference service (19) -no battery
problems here-. In the presentation room, the conference service has never been
stopped and the NPSAconference clone keeps running normally. However, since
Alice has two possible services to make use of the projector device, the PA
decides to ask her through another interface -e.g. the smart phone interface-
whether she wants to keep watching the conference or switch to the video she was
previously watching. Alice doesn’t even answer the prompt, so the conference
service continues without interruption.
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Chapter 10
Sensing the environment: the
Context Agents
Software agents in the iEAP architecture are modelled as BDI agents, represent-
ing agent beliefs, desires and intentions as data structures which determine agent
behaviour. The basis of the BDI model is that an agent has beliefs about the
world and desires to fulfill, which lead it to formulate intentions to act. Context
handling concerns the way beliefs are acquired and shared among agents.
To map the functionality of the different software agents to their beliefs,
desires and intentions we use the BDI-ASDP methodology [30]. From a design
point of view, we see iEAP software agents as knowledge-based systems. Soft-
ware agents have a facts database, where they store their beliefs about them-
selves and the world, a knowledge database which contains their desires and
plans, and an inference engine, which continuously makes decisions about the
agent beliefs and desires, triggering the specific agent intentions at each moment
to fulfill the different goals. This can be seen in Figure 10.1. The inference en-
gine of the software agents in the iEAP has been implemented using JESS [REF],
which takes care of rule-based decision making. Agents knowledge database is
comprised of JESS rules, which may be determined both at design time and at
runtime (e.g. by means of automated learning techniques). Finally, our con-
text handling architecture takes care of the adequate population of the facts
database.
For the rule-based decision making system to react accordingly to changes
in the environment, agents need to be aware of changes in the facts which
could eventually trigger any of their rules, and this ’fact awareness’ must be
maintained in real time, so that system reactions occur in a timely fashion.
To support this continuous update of the facts database, our context handling
architecture relies on a dynamic subscription mechanism. This means that
software agents know which information they may need at each moment, and
subscribe to the aproppriate agent which generates or collects that information,
so that they can be notified when relevant changes occur.
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Figure 10.1: iEAP software agents as knowledge-based systems
10.1 Context generation and context subscrip-
tion
We can give a practical definition of context as “any information which may
be of use to the system”. From this point of view, any agent in the iEAP
architecture may be a context generator, as long as there is any agent potentially
interested in the information it can provide. But for this context information
to be available to other agents, any agent providing context must declare which
information is able and willing to provide. This is accomplished via a registration
mechanism analogous to the one used for service agents. Every agent in the
iEAP architecture know, upon examination of the different rules of their own
knowledge databases, the information they can generate and share with other
agents. If there is any information they are willing to make available to other
agents, they register as context providers at the SSCA of the smart space they
are located in, specifying the kinds of facts they may provide information about.
Context providers may update their registration information dynamically should
their ability or willingness to share information change.
Any agent may query a context provider for an specific piece of information
at any time. However, query mechanisms are not always the best solution. In
particular, when an agent needs to be aware of an specific event (e.g. the tem-
perature of a lab is above 40oC), continuously querying the appropriate context
provider (e.g. the temperature agent of the room) may not be an efficient strat-
egy, as it generates a great deal of messages. Taking this into account, context
providers allow other agents to subscribe to the information they generate, and
they notify the subscribed agents upon change of the information they are sub-
scribed to or when specific conditions stated in the subscription hold (e.g. when
the room temperature is above 40oC).
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10.2 Context interpretation, aggregation and dis-
covery
According to the context definition above, sensors are the primary sources for
context information, but they are not the only ones. Context may include
information about the status of devices (e.g. whether an electronic lock is open
or closed, or what interface is being displayed in a given device). There may
be additional layers above the primary context information sources, due to the
need for additional abstraction. In such cases, context interpreters subscribe
to the primary information sources, interpret the context information received,
and register as providers of the interpreted context information. A hierarchy
of context providers at different levels of abstraction can be implemented by
placing additional layers of context interpreters above them.
Usually, agents will need heterogeneous information about a given entity
or class of entities in the system. For example, a power management agent
may need to know the energy consumption at every device in a given floor,
or it may need to know if any device is exceeding its assigned power quota.
Though the power management agent could query or subscribe to every device
for the information needed, it may be undesirable, specially if there are other
agents potentially interested in that information (e.g. ecology agents). In such
cases, context aggregators are used to increase efficiency and maintainability.
Context aggregators collect context about an specific entity or class of enti-
ties, subscribing to the necessary context providers, and register as providers of
the aggregated context information, so that context retrieval of the aggregated
information is easier and more efficient.
A special case of context aggregation is the location-specific aggregation of
context providers, which plays a key role in context discovery processes. For
each smart space, there is a Smart Space Context Discovery Agent (SSCDA),
which aggregates the information about the context providers in its associated
smart space. It does not know the information provided, but the agent who
provides it. By arranging those agents in a hierarchy parallel to that of the
smart spaces, context discovery may follow the same mechanism described for
agent, device and service discovery in chapter 5.1. When an agent needs some
information and does not know which agent to ask, it contacts the SSCDA of
the smart space it is located in. The SSCDA checks if the info is provided by
the context providers registered at this space, which may include the SSCDAs
associated to spaces situated at lower levels in the hierarchy. If no provider
is found for the requested information, the request is passed to the immediate
ancestor SSCDA in the hierachy tree, which repeats the process. When the
provider of the requested information is found, its address is returned to the
requesting agent, so that it can subscribe to the information as usual.
Figure 10.2 illustrates the hierarchical context handling mechanisms used
in the iEAP architecture for the particular case of user location, which is an
extension of the mechanisms described in [27]. Let us assume that we have
deployed different kinds of sensors (RFID readers, ultrasound sensors, heat sen-
sors, radio receivers...) in both the deskroom and the presentation room smart
spaces. Each sensor has its own device agent (DA). When those agent start,
they review the rules in their knowledge databases and register to the SSCDA
(1), specifying the information they can provide to other agents. We now deploy
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Figure 10.2: Context generation, interpretation, aggregation and subscription
Smart Space Location Agents (SSLAs) in both rooms, which is a context in-
terpreter which is able to abstract the information provided by the sensors and
to locate and identify users within the smart space. After reviewing their own
rules, the SSLAs determine which information they need to know in order to
function properly and query their appropriate SSCDA (2) for the agents which
may that information. The SSCDAs return the addresses of the DAs which
had registered to them (3), and the SSLAs subscribe to those device agents (4),
specifying the conditions . Once the SSLAs are subscribed to the information
they need, they may provide their functionality, and so they register to their
associated SSCDAs as providers of user location information for their associ-
ated smart spaces (5). To provide an efficient way to search for a given user in
the floor, we add at floor level a User Directory Service Agent (UDSA), which
is a context aggregator intended to be aware of the location of any user in the
floor. The UDSA queries the SSCDA for the location information it needs (6),
and it is told to query the different SSCDAs of the different rooms in the floor
(7). The UDSA does so, and the addresses of the differents SSLAs are returned
(8 and 9). Finally, the UDSA subscribes to the SSLAs to be notified of any
changes on the location information they provide (10).
After the process described above, we have the context hierarchy depicted in
Figure 10.3. Now the system is ready to react to hcanges in the context. Let us
imagine that use Alice enters her deskroom. The different sensors react to their
presence and report the changes to the SSLAdeskroom(1), which interprets the
new data, decides that Alice is in the deskroom and notifies the UDSA about it
(2). If, for instance, Bob’s personal agent, located on the second floor, wishes to
locate Alice, it can query the SSCDA about it (3). The SSCDA does not know
that information, but knows there is an aggregator below in the hierarchy that
could know about it, so it will return the address of the UDSA (4). Now the
personal agent can query the UDSA and finally locate Alice at the presentation
room (5).
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Figure 10.3: Reaction to changes in the context
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Chapter 11
Security architecture
At the moment no general solution to provide security in smart environments
exists, as the security requirements and trust relationships vary broadly in the
different kinds of scenario we may deal with. Therefore, each security solutions
must state the assumptions under which it is applicable and the design objectives
it pursues. At the time of writing, we have developed a solution for a smart
office scenario based on our SETH architecture. The reason to choose the smart
office scenario as the starting point is twofold. On one hand, office security
is significantly challenging, specially if we are dealing with large organizations,
where there may be hundreds, or even thousands, of employees with different
access needs and security clearances. On the other hand, due to physical access
control, security personnel and power hierarchies, enforcing security policies in
smart offices may be easier than, for instance, in urban environments.
For our security architecture for smart offices, we make the following as-
sumptions about the scenario:
• We can trust the manufacturer of our core smart office architecture to
develop well-behaved software agents.
• Connectivity to a centralized building certificate authority (BCA) is avail-
able to the Smart Space Agent Platform (SSAP) associated to each space
in the building.
• We can establish a chain of trust from our BCA to the manufacturer of
any core service or system agent needed in the building. This mean most
system and service agents running in each SSAP are manufactured by
either the owner of the smart building infrastructure or a trusted third
party.
• We can consider the hosts running each SSAP secure. Such security may
be granted through the use of Trusted Computing [31] or other secure
bootstrap techniques [32].
• We can enforce each user in the system to carry a personal identification
device, whether they intend to access the smart services provided in the
building. The nature of personal devices may vary from simple smart
identification badges to PDAs providing interfaces to access available ser-
vices.
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Also, we set the following design objectives for the security solution:
• Support for the dynamic nature of the environment. A smart space is a
highly dynamic environment, and so flexible user and device addition and
removal must be supported by the solution.
• Scalability. As smart office environments may range from small compa-
nies to large corporative buildings, the solution must be scalable, both
physically -i.e. number of spaces and extension of the whole system- and
logically -i.e. number of potential users and devices-.
• Reliable Authentication and Access Control. Security requirements in
smart offices are usually more rigurous that those in othe smart envi-
ronments. Reliable authentication and role-based access control must be
provided at user, agent, and device levels.
• Support for devices with different capabilities. Smart offices may host a
great diversity of devices, even more than other smart home scenarios.
Fixed infrastructures coexist with portable and mobile devices, and the
resources available to different kinds of devices, in terms of thetherness,
power-supply, bandwith and computing power vary greatly. The solution
must allow to exploit the resources available to most powerful devices
without restraining the possibility of using more limited devices.
Taking these assumptions and objectives into account, in this chapter we present
our security proposal for the smart office, describing the approach we have taken
to address each of the security issues we outlined in section ??.
11.1 Message authentication, confidentiality and
integrity
As we have seen in section ??, message security is usually provided using cryp-
tographic means, which are well-known and mature. In pervasive computing,
however, concerns about resource limitations such as battery life and comput-
ing power raise, and therefore a trade-off between security and performance is
needed. Asymmetric criptography is known to provide better security at the
cost of more bandwidth and CPU cycles. But there are devices, such as sensors
commonly used in smart environment, which cannot afford to perform the cal-
culations required. Even those devices which can deal with the computational
load, cannot do this for a extended time amount if they are battery powered.
Therefore, the nature of the communication being secured and the devices tak-
ing part in the communication must be leveraged to decide whether asymmetric
or symmetric cryptography is more suitable to provide the required security.
In our proposal, we assume the use of asymmetric cryptography is accept-
able at the SSAPs and at the personal devices (PDAs or smart phones) of the
users. However, since personal devices are battery powered, the use of this kind
of cryptography should be minimized. Taking this into account our security ar-
chitecture uses asymmetric cryptography to agree a shared secret between the
communicating parties, using a simple handshake protocol:
A→ B : EKpuB
{
S1, t1, SKprA {S1, t1}
}
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B → A : EKpuA
{
S2, t2, SKprB {S2, t2}
}
S = KDF (S1, S2)
Here, the private key of A and the public key of B are used, respectively, to
sign and encrypt a chosen secret S1. B answers to the proposal with its own
choice S2, and both proposals are hashed to derive a final secret S using a hash-
based key derivation function KDF . Time stamps (t1and t2)are added to the
messages as a coarse reference to prevent replay attacks. Further communication
between A and B is secured by deriving from the shared secret S the keys used
to provide the different security services.
Once a secret shared secret has been established, integrity of a given message
m is protected by using HMAC with an integrity key Ki derived from this
shared secret. Protection against message interception, delay and replay may
be provided by including a time stamp t. However, as secure synchronization
between all distributed devices in the system may be rather a problem than a
solution, timestamps are used in our implementation only as a coarse reference.
Protection against message interception and replay is provided by including in
the HMAC a sequence number n. The first sequence number is also derived
from the agreed shared secret S.
A→ B : m, t,HMACKi (m, t, n)
When necessary, this information may be sent confidentially to B by en-
crypting it using cryptographic material also derived from the shared secret.
11.2 Key Distribution and User Personal Devices
As we have stated above, each SSAP has its own asymmetric key pair, which
public key is stored at the BCA. Whenever a new user is added to the system,
key pairs are generated for use within the building. If the user has a personal
certificate issued by a trusted root certificate authority, a mechanism is provided
so that the user can securely generate its own key pair and have its public key
stored and published at the BCA. If no electronic proof of the user identity is
available, human intervention is required: a security officer must register user
data to create a new user in the system and her associated key pair.
The nature of the physical device holding user cryptographic material may
vary depending on the manner the user will interact with the system. Users and
casual visitors without a personal device are given a smartcard, which can be
inserted into the different interface devices in the building to access to any ser-
vices requiring authentication. For users with access to service personalisation,
a Personal Agent (PA) is created and launched on their Personal Device agent
platform. An additional asymmetric key pair is generated for the PA, so that
it can act on behalf of the user to adapt the environment to his preferences.
Having two different key pairs for the user and the PA allows the system to
distinguish between automated requests and direct requests from the user, and
also allows the system to ask for user confirmation (e.g. a passphrase) when
dealing with sensitive tasks.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 11.1: An unknown visitor with a personal certificate enters the building
11.3 User, Device and Agent Authentication
User authentication is performed by means of certificates. Though it would be
desirable, we cannot assume every user of the system to have a personal certifi-
cate issued by a root certificate authority. Therefore, the building must have its
own Building-level Certificate Authority Agent (BCAA) to issue Building-level
Certificates (BCs) for any user entering the building. A BC associate the user
identity to a public key and to a certain number of roles, used to distinguish,
for example, an employee from an unknown visitor.
Building-level Certificates are used to authenticate users to the Smart Space
Coordinator Agents (SSCA) whenever they enter a new space. Each individual
space within the building rooms, halls, elevators...- has its own BC, which is
used to authenticate system agents and persistent service agents running in the
Smart Space Agent Platform.
Figure 11.1 illustrates one of the the most complex cases of user authentica-
tion in the system. An unknown visitor with a personal device which complies
to our agent architecture approaches the building entrance. The user has a per-
sonal certificate issued by a trusted certificate authority stored in her personal
device. The SSCA at the entrance space contacts the personal agent and re-
quests it to authenticate to the system, sending it a challenge (1). The PA signs
the challenge using the personal certificate of its user (and probably requesting
him to enter a passphrase) and sends it to the SSCA (2). The SSCA, unable
to verify the signature, contacts the Building-level Certificate Authority Agent
about an unknown user trying to authenticate the system (3). The BCAA ver-
ifies the user personal signature and contacts the personal agent (4), requesting
it to generate asymmetric key pairs for the user and the PA1 and sends back the
public keys (5). With these keys the BCAA issues the corresponding Building-
level Certificates (BCs) for this user and his PA, with an appropriate expiration
date and tagged to the role of Electronically Authenticated Visitor -see section
11.4- (6). The Personal Agent may now use its certificate to authenticate to the
SSCA and request access to the building (7).
Each SSAP has its own asymmetric key pair and its own Building-level
Certificate associated to its public key. All system agents and persistent service
agents running in the SSAP share this key pair and can use it to authenticate
to users, personal agents and other SSAPs and to exchange session keys with
them as described in section 11.1. As stated at the beginning of chapter ??,
1We are assuming in this example case that the personal device is able to generate such
key pairs. If not, the architecture provides a mechanism to have the key pair generated by
the BCAA.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 11.2: Secure communication with a non-persistent service agent
we assume the SSAP to be secure, and system and persistent agents are code-
signed. These agents are thought as the agents of the specific space controlled
by the SSAP and so we see coherence in making them share a key associated to
that space.
Similar assumptions cannot be taken regarding the security of other devices
in the smart space. We cannot guarantee the physical security of switches, light
bulbs or temperature sensors as we can guarantee that of the SSAP, and thus
we consider inapproppriate to share the SSAP key with these devices and the
agents controlling them. Furthermore, some of these devices may not have the
computing power, storage space or battery life to put up with asymmetric cryp-
tography. Therefore we use secret key cryptography to communicate with this
devices, in a way very similar to Resurrecting Duckling [22]. In our architec-
ture, each SSCA shares a secret key with each device in the space. By means
of these keys, it acts as the mother duck, creating secure transient associations
between devices, user and agents within its associated space by assigning tem-
porary shared secret keys to pairs of principals. We have not yet explored the
possibility of adding tamper resistance to our devices as suggested by the Res-
urrecting Duckling protocol, but we plan to do so at least with the most critical
devices.
Non-persistent service agents, having mobility features, are not considered
secure enough to share the SSAP key pair. Taking this into account, we use the
same secure communication schema for non-persistent service agents that the
one we used for devices. Figure 11.2 shows this communication mechanism with
an example. The personal agent request a video-conference service to the SSCA
(1), using a previously agreed session key KS1. After checking the request is
legitimate (we will deal with authorization in the following section), and as there
is no active agent able to handle the user request, a non-persistent service agent
NPSA is created (2), imprinted to the SSCA by means of a shared secret key,
KS2. Then the SSCA generates a temporary session key for the communication
between the PA and the newly created service agent, KS3, and sends it securely
to both parties (3), which can now communicate using this shared secret key
until it expires (4).
11.4 Authorization and delegation
Once users, devices and agents are authenticated and can establish secure com-
munications among themselves, we use a credential-based approach to provide
authorization services. The basic idea is that users and agents are allowed to
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Figure 11.3: Credential-based authorisation
perform an action if they can show a credential signed by a valid authorization
authority. In our system this authority is represented by Smart Space Autho-
rization Agents (SSAA). There is one SSAA for each SSAP, and there can be
SSAA associated to groups of SSAPs to provide a hierarchical tree of autho-
rization agents. We can have, for example, authorization agents for different
floors -encompassing all SSAPs in the floor-. We will usually have at least a
building-level authorization agent (BAA).
A typical sequence of the mechanism can be seen in figure 11.3. A personal
agent of user A wants to set the ambient music of a deskroom to suit A’s pref-
erences. Once service discovery and authentication have been performed, the
PA makes its request (1) to the corresponding service agent (say, for example, a
ambient music service agent AMSA). The PA can supply any appropriate cre-
dentials with the request if it already knows they are required (e.g. if it usually
requests the same service every day). If the needed credentials are not supplied,
AMSA may simply deny access to the service or ask for the specific credentials
needed to access the service (2) -for some services, disclosure of the needed cre-
dentials may suppose a risk and thus may be avoided by policy-. If the PA has
not the required credentials, it can request them to the corresponding SSAA
(3), which will check the security policies and issue the approppriate credentials
if they comply with those policies (4). Finally, the PA shows the credentials to
the AMSA (5), which can then verify them and process the request.
There are some additional considerations regarding credential issuing, dis-
tribution and storage. Building-level credentials are usually associated to user
roles, defining, for example, which spaces can be accessed by visitors, or which
services are available for an employee in any smoking-room in the building.,
thus implementing a particular form of RBAC [23]. These role based creden-
tials may be attached to the user building-level certificate, in order to avoid
the burden of having to request an specific credential for each request. There
may be, however, a limitation for credential storage in the user personal devices.
Furthermore, for users not carrying a personal device with enough computing
or storage capability, or for those users not having a Personal Agent acting on
their behalf, the above protocol is not applicable. For these cases, the system
provides an alternative mechanism where the service agents themselves ask the
authorization agents for the user credentials. This will be the typical scenario
for unknown visitors provided with a smart card to access certain spaces of the
building.
Delegation is handled as a particular case of authorization, where the au-
thorisation authority which issues a credential to allow a principal A to perform
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action X is not an SSAA, but another principal B which is allowed to perform
said action. This allows, for example, a personal agent to issue a credential
allowing a service agent (for example, the agent controlling a presentation dis-
play) to access a file stored at the user’s computer (containing, for example, a
slide presentation document).
Both policy definition and certificate and credential managemet are per-
formed using an agent-based implementation of SPKI [33], as it has been proven
as a reliable public-key infrastructure with a good trade-off between expressive
power for policy and credential definition and computational load.
11.5 Handling agent mobility
The use of mobile agents raises numerous security considerations [34]. At the
moment, our architecture only allows mobility to non-persistent service agents.
These agents are created and started by the SSCA upon request of the services
they provide, thus allowing certain degree of control of what is running in the
SSAP. To increase protection against malicious agents, all non-persistent agents
are code-signed by the manufacturer, whose public key is known to all the
SSAPs. Whenever a mobile agent tries to migrate to another agent platform, the
code signature is verified at the destination to ensure it has not been maliciously
altered. To protect against malicious changes in the state of execution of the
agent, the request upon which the agent has been launched is signed by the
launching SSAP and attached to the migrating agent, so that the destination
platform can restrict what the agent is allowed to do based on the signed request.
Furthermore, whenever an agent migrates, its state is signed by the source SSAP,
thus taking responsibility of the generated state.
As mobile agents may travel through different SSAPs, even through differ-
ent buildings, they cannot share the SSAP key as the system and persistent
service agents do. Instead, the SSAP generates temporary symmetric shared
keys whenever a mobile agent needs to communicate with another principal.
Those keys are revoked if the mobile agent leaves the SSAP.
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Chapter 12
Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we have presented a hierarchical architecture for developing smart
environments using software agents. The main advantage of using agents is the
autonomy that they can provide. An intelligent agent bases its behaviour on a
set of high-level goals, and determines autonomously the necessary actions to
meet those goals. These actions may include interaction and cooperation with
other agents. In fact, multiagent systems are distributed systems, which made
them very suitable for their application to smart home environments, where
coordination of distributed sensors and effectors is needed. The use of a modular,
hierarchical approach allows for high flexibility and scalability, which makes the
solution applicable to different smart space scenarios, ranging from small smart
workplace rooms like those described in [13] and [16] to large, hierarchically
arranged spaces like the urban environment proposed by [15].
Regarding service personalization, COBRA [17] is probably the research
work most closely related to ours, as it uses software agents for their context-
aware architecture, and defines a broker-centric management strategy for each
domain, in a way quite similar to the role our SSCAs play in each smart space.
However, COBRA focuses mainly on context sharing rather than service per-
sonalization, and personal agents are limited to personal mobile devices. In our
solution, we consider the possibility of having users who do not always carry
(or do not own) personal devices. To address these cases, we take advantage
of personal agent mobility. This approach was first foreseen in [35], though the
solution proposed there still requires users to carry personal handheld devices.
Concerning service access and interfaces, we have developed interfaces over
handheld devices, capable of adapting themselves to the location where the user
is, providing the corresponding interfaces for the services available at that loca-
tion. We have implemented some sample services to show how software agents
can help to adapt the environment to the preferences or desires of the user.
Non-persistent agents allow, for example, to provide a multimedia service which
follow user movements throughout the house in real time, so that there is no loss
of information for the user. Software agents provide the necessary technology
to achieve the required degree of distribution, autonomy and intelligence.
There are vastly different lines of research regarding security in smart envi-
ronments. Though they usually start from the same general assumptions, the
strategies they adopt and the importance they associate to each security issue in
pervasive computing vary greatly, according to the different scenarios they are
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intended to deal with. To address the problem of security in a given smart en-
vironment, specific requirements and assumptions imposed by the environment
must be leveraged to determine the most suitable architecture for the solution.
As a first step, we have chosen to focus on smart offices, and we have developed
a security solution specifically tailored to this scenario, which takes advantage of
the particular characteristics of the environment to satisfy the security requeri-
ments. We believe our solution to be adequately balanced. We have extracted
the advantages of federated solutions for security in pervasive computing like
Cerberus [36] and distributed solutions like the Ressurrected Duckling [22] and
put them together to obtain an hierarchical, agent-based solution which is flex-
ible and scalable enough to be applicable to different smart office scenarios,
ranging from small businesses to large organizations.
Some issues remain open to further research. We are now implementing new
smart office services in our own workplaces to check if the proposed architecture
is flexible enough to handle them. We are also refining context management,
with special interest in making user location more reliable and efficient. Regard-
ing our security proposal, mobile agent security is handled in a very restrictive
manner (code signing), and we would like to extend the architecture to support
other forms of protection that allow more flexible introduction of new services
and devices. Tamper-resistance of the devices as suggested by Stajano should
be implemented. Also, we need to address the problem of availability, which
has been left apart in this proposal.
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